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Stanley Hauerwas’s Influence on 
Catholic Moral eologians 
 
JANA MARGUERITE BENNETT 
 
 
NE MIGHT BEGIN considering the reception of Stanley Hau-
erwas’s work in Catholic moral theology by asking: why 
did both Commonweal and First ings opt to publish re-
views of Hauerwas’s memoir Hannah’s Child? What is it 
about Hauerwas’s theological discussion of his own work that engag-
es an educated Catholic audience of magazines putatively represent-
ing both ends of the spectrum? It is not only that both journals ac-
tively seek engagement with Protestant voices; nor is it only that 
Hauerwas has a degree of renown, thanks to Time magazine.1 It is 
also exactly what Peter Steinfels alludes to in his review, that Hau-
erwas is at once disturbing and rewarding for Catholics.2 Hauerwas is 
so strongly in support of certain “liberal” Catholic ideals (e.g., that 
ethics should not be about laws in the way it was perceived pre-
Vatican II), so intensely in support of certain “conservative” Catholic 
ideals (e.g., that tradition and authority should be important aspects 
of Christian life), and so seemingly dismissive of natural law and 
state politics3 that Catholics cannot help but have a kind of unsettled 
fascination with him and his work.  
1 Time Magazine named Hauerwas “America’s Best eologian” in September 2001. 
Ironically, the issue appeared on newsstands the day before September 11, 2001, so 
was quickly eclipsed by events. See Jean Bethke Elshatain, “Christian Contrarian,” 
Time Magazine (September 17, 2001). http://www.time.com/time/magazine/art-
icle/0,9171,1000859,00.html.  
2 Peter Steinfels, “A Bricklayer’s Son: Stanley Hauerwas and the Christian Differ-
ence,” Commonweal 137, no. 9 (May 7, 2010): 12-17. 
3 Gilbert Meilaender, “A Dedicated Life,” First ings (May 2010), http://www. 
firstthings.com/article/2010/04/a-dedicated-life.  
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As a Catholic student of Hauerwas, part of my attraction to his 
work has been his ability to bridge intra-Catholic divides, such as 
that between “liberals” and “conservatives” or Magisterium and theo-
logians. Even more, I think that Hauerwas helps us be more thor-
oughly “Catholic,” in the sense of being unified in the Body of Christ, 
because of the way he seeks to do theology. In this essay, I focus on 
Catholic reception of Hauerwas’s work in three distinct areas: eccle-
siology, embodied Christian practices, and political theology. Each of 
these has been the source of both long-standing intra-Catholic debate 
and debate in the Catholic reception of Hauerwas’s work. So, each of 
these also becomes a way of seeing that Hauerwas bridges some intel-
lectual divides. Catholics across the spectrum might be disturbed by 
Hauerwas’s work, but also find some reward in it as well, as the pos-
sibility for seeing Catholicism in a new light.  
 
HAUERWASIAN ECCLESIOLOGY: FRIENDSHIP AND FORGIVENESS 
It may sound odd to claim that Hauerwas’s ecclesiology is charac-
terized by friendship and forgiveness given the perception that Hau-
erwas meets every argument with a fight and spreads discord wher-
ever he wanders. Yet that is exactly the claim of this section, despite 
the vaunted charge against Hauerwas that he is sectarian. I begin by 
attending to the Catholic context of this sectarian charge, and then 
explain why Hauerwas is not susceptible to that charge, due to his 
emphasis on friendship and forgiveness. ese ecclesiological em-
phases will be shown to be exactly why Catholics, particularly theolo-
gians in training, have turned to Hauerwas.  
ough one of Hauerwas’s doctoral advisors, James Gustafson, is 
most oen cited in making the accusation of sectarianism,4 numer-
ous Catholic theologians have lobbed the charge as well. Richard 
McBrien describes how a sectarian approach produces both an overly 
narrow ecclesiology and a distorted stance toward the world outside 
the Church. For McBrien, sectarianism names an idea that the 
Church is “closed in on itself as a righteous minority, bearing the 
promise of salvation for those willing to subject themselves to it….”5 
Sectarianism thereby divides the Church. McBrien worries that sec-
tarians perceive themselves as “churches within and even over 
against, the Church,” like, for example, the Donatists.6  
4 James Gustafson, “e Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on eology, the Church, 
and the University,” Proceedings of the Catholic eological Society of America 40 
(1985): 83-94. 
5 Richard P. McBrien, e Church: e Evolution of Catholicism (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2008), 363. 
6 McBrien, e Church, 366. 
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e question about sectarianism (Hauerwas’s or otherwise) con-
nects to an internal Catholic debate about magisterial teaching and 
the hierarchy. Having some sense of the internal debate shows more 
clearly why Hauerwas comes across as troublesome, but also points 
toward why Hauerwas might bridge some of the divides in this de-
bate. For example, McBrien sees a link between sectarianism and a 
centralized hierarchy; sectarianism operates against unity and colle-
giality, two of McBrien’s concerns. Collaboration and direct input 
from local churches and bishops needs to be encouraged on pro-
nouncements; otherwise, unity and ecumenism are at risk. A central-
ized hierarchy, like sectarianism, allows for a too-narrow account of 
the Church, for it lends easily to a view that some people are “real 
Catholics” while others are not. As McBrien notes: “Agreement with 
and obedience to all of [the pope’s] teachings and practical decrees 
are readily taken as the measure of one’s fidelity to the Church, if not 
also the integrity of one’s faith.”7 Such a view seems in line with the 
“people versus Magisterium” or “theologians versus Magisterium” 
motif, which figures frequently in recent Catholic discourse, and was 
most recently evident when the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 
wrote public letters against the works of Todd Salzman and Michael 
Lawler in the fall of 2010, and Elizabeth Johnson in the spring of 
2011. Salzman, Lawler, and Johnson all saw themselves as reaching 
toward, and doing theology for, the people of God in an open and 
inclusive way. By contrast, the bishops’ pronouncements against 
these theologians’ works make the hierarchy seem quite ecclesiologi-
cally sectarian in McBrien’s eyes.  
Given this Catholic context, Hauerwas’s “sectarian” influence 
would seem to have come at a particularly bad time—just when 
Catholics are having a long discussion about the reception of Vatican 
II, the identity of the Church, and Christians’ relationship to the 
world. On McBrien’s view, for example, Hauerwas’s students strive 
to create an enclave of perfect Christians, and to do so, they hearken 
back nostalgically to the worlds they perceive as necessarily better, 
especially the patristic and medieval periods. eir view of the 
Church, like that of the centralized hierarchy, is a faulty view on 
McBrien’s account. ey do not see the whole People of God, nor the 
Holy Spirit at work in the broad and diverse group of people called 
Christians. McBrien sums up this distaste of some Catholic thinkers8 
toward Hauerwas and his students by saying: 
7 McBrien, e Church, 306. 
8 Lisa Sowle Cahill has written from a different, more positive view about Hauerwas 
and his “communitarian ethic,” though she worries about the disconnection between 
“Christian community” and political life. However, Hauerwas would argue against a 
“communitarian view” as well, as he does in In Good Company, which at the least 
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[Stanley Hauerwas] has many Catholic disciples—former students at 
Duke—now teaching in various Catholic colleges and universities in 
the United States, none of whom has attained individual prominence 
but who have collectively had a marked influence on Catholic theo-
logical education, particularly in the field of moral theology. Like 
Hauerwas’s, their views on Christian ethics are an expression of an 
underlying sectarian ecclesiological perspective, especially as it re-
lates to the role of the Church in the world.9 
 
McBrien is not the only one who sees Hauerwas’s students as disci-
ples.10 Jeffrey Stout uses the term “followers” in his book Democracy 
and Tradition.11 Both terms conjure the image of a secret sect, much 
like the sectarianism that scholars from Gustafson to Gerard 
Mannion have sought to critique.12  
e difficulty with parsing out Hauerwas’s place in this conversa-
tion is, of course, that he is not Roman Catholic and he has a very 
different view of the Magisterium than either “liberal” or “conserva-
tive” Catholics would have, and his views on related questions do not 
fall neatly into one camp. In what follows, I discuss Hauerwas’s ap-
proaches to theology, with the basic contention that Hauerwas’s ec-
clesiology is best understood as rooted in friendship and forgiveness 
rather than as sectarian. ese themes are readily evident in Hau-
suggests that all parties concerned are using language in different ways and lack 
some understanding of the differing Catholic and Protestant contexts from which 
they come. See Cahill’s article at “L’ethique communautarienne et le catolicisme 
américain,” Recherches de Science Religieuse 95:1 (2007): 21-40. Hauerwas’s discus-
sion is found in In Good Company: e Church as Polis (South Bend, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1995). 
9 McBrien, e Church, 388. 
10 McBrien’s thoughts about Hauerwas students are surely affected by his role in the 
tenure decisions for Michael Baxter in the late 1990s. On this controversy, see Pame-
la Schaeffer, “Notre Dame Disputes May Signal a Shi,” http://www.nd.edu/ 
~afreddos/papers/baxncr.htm. However, apart from this, McBrien’s thought is rep-
resentative of many scholars in North America and Europe. 
11 He alludes to adherents of other authors, like Emerson or John Finnis, as followers 
as well, but Hauerwas’s “followers” take on a different tone in Stout’s work: “A cynic 
might say that the secret of Hauerwas’s vast influence in the church in the 1980s and 
1990s lay in the imprecision of the sacrifice he appeared to be demanding of his fol-
lowers…. [I]n the absence of a clear statement of the price Christians must be willing 
to pay, his audience was able to indulge itself in fantasies of martyrdom without 
experiencing actual poverty or persecution at all.” Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tra-
dition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 157-8. 
12 Gustafson, “e Sectarian Temptation”; also, see Gerard Mannion, Ecclesiology 
and Postmodernity: Questions for the Church in Our Time (Collegeville, MN: Michael 
Glazier Books, 2007).  
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erwas’s work and in his training of doctoral students and their own 
commitments to seeking friendship and forgiveness.  
Hauerwas is as positioned as any other thinker, being, as he is, 
American, Texan, and at least trying to be Christian.13 ere are 
those who poke fun at what they perceive to be a Hauerwas panthe-
on: Barth, Yoder, and Aquinas, while Alasdair MacIntyre and Aristo-
tle take on the role of demi-gods. Many other scholars then seeming-
ly become demons: Rahner, Tillich, the Niebuhr brothers, liberal 
feminism, to name a few.  
Yet Hauerwas’s emphasis as a teacher is to encourage students to 
read people for their arguments rather than reading particular people 
who share certain sensibilities or who “have it right.” Just before I le 
Duke University, having obtained my degree, I stopped by his office 
one last time to ask for some advice now that I faced the different 
challenges of teaching students while doing research. I knew that the 
graduate student days of being able to organize my time more or less 
freely were at an end; how was one to balance what would surely be-
come a busier schedule in the days ahead? So I asked, “How do you 
sort out what to read and what to leave out?” “I can’t tell you that,” 
he answered. “You’ve got to read everything.” 
I should have known that would be his answer. We never read his 
own work in seminars,14 but we read the people who influenced him, 
and those people were wide-ranging and numerous. In a year-long 
seminar on Ludwig Wittgenstein,15 Hauerwas brought in Peter Hill’s 
book Stone and Stonemasons: e Making of a Cathedral16 because 
13 To say Hauerwas is “positioned” is not the same as saying he “has a position,” 
which I discuss in the third section of this essay.  
14 Indeed, when in the summer of 2010, I had a chance to meet with the other au-
thors of Hauerwas’s students’ festschri Unsettling Arguments: A Festschri on the 
Occasion of Stanley Hauerwas’s 70th Birthday, eds. Charles Pinches, Kelly Johnson, 
and Charles Collier (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), one thing many of us men-
tioned was that writing these essays had meant we had opportunity to go back and 
read his work. 
15 In the seminar we read, among other things: the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), Philosophical Investigations (New York: 
Macmillan, 1953), e Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 
On Certainty (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), Ray Monk’s biography Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: e Duty of Genius (New York: Penguin, 1990), Fergus Kerr’s eology 
Aer Wittgenstein (London: SPCK, 1997), Carl Elliot’s Slow Cures and Bad Philoso-
pher: Essays on Wittgenstein, Medicine and Bioethics (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2001), James Edward’s Ethics without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral 
Life (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1985), Brad Kallenberg’s Ethics as 
Grammar: Changing the Postmodern Subject (Notre Dame: e University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2001), G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), and a number of essays and articles.  
16 Published by Cascade for the Dean and Chapter of Lincoln Cathedral, 1989. 
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some of the commentary seemed exactly to illuminate something 
Wittgenstein had said. Some of his students from the early 1990s tell 
a story of wanting to catch him out on reading: they would try to 
come up with the most obscure title they could and mention it in 
class; Hauerwas had oen read it, but if he had not, he delighted in 
having another interesting book to study, returning next week with 
comments from his reading! Similarly, he oen encouraged his stu-
dents to take courses with faculty in other departments at Duke Uni-
versity, such as David Aers or Romand Coles, not as add-ons for stu-
dents interested in English or Political Science as a kind of side dish, 
but as fully integral to the study of theological ethics. rough his 
own academic practice, Hauerwas encouraged his students to be in-
terested in what they did not yet know or understand.  
Because of this broad swath of reading, the experience of many of 
us in Hauerwas’s seminars was that of a person who is seriously en-
gaged with theology, teaching his students how to be seriously en-
gaged with theology. He is humble enough to know that there are 
others who say it better, and he is fair enough to know that people 
with whom he has great disagreements are still oen people with in-
teresting things to say. As he liked to gently remind his students, 
“You may disagree with them, but remember that they are friends.” 
Hauerwas tried to get his graduate students to think about and re-
spect others’ work because they can tell us something important 
about our presumptions.  
Former students of Hauerwas do not agree with him or with each 
other on many things, and they do not aim to live in some kind of 
pure, New Testament community, or one that hearkens to a “tradi-
tionalist” view of church authority. Indeed, as Hauerwas and Charles 
Pinches write, 
 
[I]nsofar as they believe that the God of the universe, who has ex-
tended Himself to us in the Jewish people and in Jesus, invites us to 
become His friends by sharing in His suffering, Christians cannot ac-
cept a vision of friendship which excludes (or overcomes) otherness 
in the friend, or which shelters her from sharing our sufferings or de-
feats.17  
 
Friendship is one of the keys for understanding Hauerwas’s dis-
cussion of church as much as understanding how his graduate stu-
dents interact with each other and their colleagues in the field. As 
17 Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, Christians Among the Virtues: eological 
Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1997), 44. 
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erese Lysaught and David Matzko McCarthy describe in their in-
troduction to the multi-author Gathered for the Journey, “we hope 
that the multiplicity of ways of expressing things (among the thirteen 
authors) points to the unfathomable mystery that is the God with 
whom we journey and to the ever-creative richness of the Christian 
life.”18 Friendships with many people truly demonstrate catholicity: a 
unity in God but with a multiplicity of voices. Christians need each 
other in part because we cannot be a church of one;19 such a position 
is ahistorical as well as opposed to Jesus’ great commandments.  
Hauerwas’s focus on friendship also helped lead some of his doc-
toral students to form an “intentional Christian community” in 1990, 
known un-illustriously as “Iredell House” for the street on which the 
house exists. Catholic doctoral students John Berkman and David 
Matzko McCarthy were original members of the house; others, like 
William Cavanaugh, were connected to the house via a prayer group 
comprised of several of Hauerwas’s other students who could not live 
in the house because of marital status or other commitments. e 
activities at Iredell House centered on the community’s covenant 
which, among other things, asked community members to pledge to 
be a “community of Christian friends” who live together simply, who 
pray together and who practice hospitality toward each other and 
toward all who might visit the house. is house was no house-
church; it was not an alternative to being a member of a church (also 
an expectation of Iredell House occupants), and the people of Iredell 
House have, to this day,20 represented a wide range of Christian de-
nominations: Presbyterian, Anglican, Methodist, Friends, United 
Church of Christ, Lutheran, evangelical non-denominational, Bap-
tist, and more. With such an array of divergence in practicing Chris-
tianity, there were oen disagreements, and so another part of the 
covenant is: “Trusting in God's grace, we are bound to each other 
in…confession and forgiveness, and hospitality to Christ in whatever 
guise he comes to us. May the Spirit lead us.” 
18 “Introduction: e Course of Moral inking,” in Gathered for the Journey: Moral 
eology in Catholic Perspective, eds. David Matzko McCarthy and M. erese 
Lysaught (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007), 19. It is not 
only that this is a multi-author work; the essays in the volume also explicitly seek to 
overcome divides. For example, David Cloutier’s essay, “Human Fulfillment” (pp. 
134-152), seeks to bridge a divide between understanding action in relation to indi-
vidual conscience, on the one hand, and the necessity of community on the other.  
19 at Christians need each other does not, by the way, negate that Christians also 
welcome and receive friends who are not Christian. 
20 Other Catholic doctoral students who lived in Iredell were Kelly Johnson, Dana 
Dillon, and David Cloutier. Michael Baxter lived in the front apartment of the house 
while at Duke, and was therefore associated with the house’s members. 
 
                                                 
        Stanley Hauerwas’s Influence on Catholic Moral eologians 155 
 
 It is not surprising that forgiveness is a crucial part of the cove-
nant, for forgiveness is also central to what doctoral students have 
learned from Hauerwas. For Hauerwas, friendship goes hand in hand 
with forgiveness. One line that Hauerwas’s students oen heard was, 
“Sin is all the way down.” at is to say, sin is deeply embedded in 
society, a point Hauerwas seems to retain from his reading of Rein-
hold Niebuhr.21 Yet this does not occasion despair or hellfire-and-
damnation speeches so much as a recognition that we need to be 
constantly seeking forgiveness. In e Peaceable Kingdom, Hauerwas 
writes: 
 
because we have learned to live as a forgiven people, as a people no 
longer in control, we also find we can become a whole people…. 
When we exist as a forgiven people we are able to be at peace with 
our histories, so that now God’s life determines our whole way of be-
ing—our character. We no longer need to deny our past, or tell our-
selves false stories, as now we can accept what we have been without 
the knowledge of our sin destroying us.22 
 
Hauerwas’s account of church involves Christians recognizing that 
their journey toward friendship with God is about, among other 
things, seeking forgiveness, while “the world” continues as though 
sins are not sins. Hence the o-misinterpreted Hauerwasian mantra, 
“e first task of the church is to be the church,” which is unfortu-
nately sometimes seen as sectarian withdrawal of a “perfect society” 
from the sin-ridden world. To the contrary, in a culture that is fo-
cused on individualism rather than friendship, on self-sufficiency 
and autonomy rather than the recognition of sin and need for for-
giveness, Hauerwas’ ecclesiology of friendship and forgiveness is an 
hospitable gi to, rather than a withdrawal from, the world.  
If Hauerwas comes across as “disturbing” for Catholics in his dis-
cussion of the Church, I suspect that this is, in part, because there is a 
difference in what scholars mean by “church.” McBrien clearly wants 
to name “church” as “more self-consciously catholic”23 (with a lower-
21 Reinhold Niebuhr’s account of Original Sin shows it as deeply intertwined through 
the whole of society. While Hauerwas critiques Reinhold Niebuhr in his Gifford 
Lectures, With the Grain of the Universe: e Church’s Witness and Natural eology 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001), for using sin as a way to develop a natural 
theology for non-Christians, he does not actually repudiate Niebuhr’s view of sin, 
that it is inescapable and yet unnecessary.  
22 Stanley Hauerwas, “e Peaceable Kingdom,” in e Hauerwas Reader, ed. John 
Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 135-
6. Notably, in a footnote here, Hauerwas refers to H. Richard Niebuhr’s e Meaning 
of Revelation (Louisville; Westminster John Knox, 2006). 
23 McBrien, e Church, 368. 
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case c) and willing to participate in dialogue with other religious tra-
ditions; it is not closed in on itself, not authoritarian, but is open, 
especially to lay leadership, leadership by women. ose people and 
movements who do not participate in McBrien’s kind of vision, or 
who are perceived as speaking against that vision, disturb the (oen 
important) notions he has about what church is.  
Insofar as students of Hauerwas come from various churches and 
denominations, there is no common ecclesiology among them. Even 
if we narrow these students to Catholics, there are clear differences 
and disagreements. In a review of works by eight of these former stu-
dents, four of them Catholic, Charles Pinches outlines clear disa-
greements in how ecclesiology functions in their moral arguments. 
He notes that there is a tendency in some toward a “narrative of de-
cline.”24 Nonetheless, there is nothing within this spectrum that ex-
cludes thinking of “church” in such a way that takes some of McBri-
en’s comments into account. In general, students of Hauerwas to car-
ry forward a tendency to see that American Christianity too oen 
appropriates non-Christian ideals to its detriment, as I allude to 
above. Neither Hauerwas nor most of his students would maintain 
that one can separate from other Christians or the “world” in a sec-
tarian way but would rather attempt to get people to see that embrac-
ing complicity with “the world” oen leads to trouble. us it is that 
friendship and forgiveness provide means of moving toward God, 
even as Christians remain in the world and in a church that cannot 
separate itself from the world. 
 
EMBODIED CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP  
Another major theme of Hauerwas’ work is his insistence that 
theology be accountable to the concrete embodied practices of the 
Church. e emphasis on embodiment and practices is not simply a 
matter of “following through” on what Christians preach; rather it 
recognizes that Christianity is not a set of abstract ideas or theories, 
but a particular way of life. An emphasis for many Protestant theolo-
gians, like Reinhold Niebuhr,25 was to ensure that Christians began 
with the right ideas. If one only began with (and could find) the right 
principle, such as love or justice, everything else would follow. e 
difficulty with this, on Hauerwas’s view, is that if the point is the 
principle, one really ought to follow the principle rather than Jesus; 
thus the concern is with not placing abstract ideas ahead of the in-
24 Charles Pinches, “Hauerwas and Political eology: e Next Generation,” Jour-
nal of Religious Ethics 36:3 (Sept 2008): 513-42. 
25 See, for example, Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems 
(New York: Scribner, 1953). 
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carnate God made known to us in embodied practices. Christian life 
needs to witness to Jesus Christ. 
A Catholic subculture that was, in itself, a whole way of life, did 
not have to confront this Protestant concern in the same way or at 
the same time. So, surely some of the fascination with Hauerwas’s 
work among Catholics is related to the sociological changes U.S. 
Catholics have experienced in the past four decades. Intellectually, 
Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris ensured that the theological em-
phasis for the twentieth century would be neo-omism and a focus 
on a universal account of truth in relation to the Church.26 Sociologi-
cally, anti-Catholicism and immigration were just two of the factors 
in the United States that generated Catholic sub-cultures, for both 
theologians and lay people. My colleague William Portier has help-
fully discussed Catholics living in a sub-culture between World War 
I and the post-Vatican II era: 
 
[W]hether they lived in New Jersey or Oklahoma, they participated 
in varying degrees in a shared religious culture. ey learned similar 
practices of praying and thinking that added to their demographic 
distinctiveness. is Catholic world was surely not airtight. But it 
helped to protect generations of immigrants from Nativism and anti-
Catholicism even as it schooled them in how to be Americans. As a 
result, most American Catholics never felt the full effects of their 
country’s voluntary religious culture.27  
 
e Church and its prayers, sacraments, and processions—mostly in 
Latin, which served to reinforce a subculture—formed and shaped a 
view of one’s world. Prior to Vatican II, Catholicism was embodied 
in the sense that it was a way of life, that no part of one’s life could 
escape Catholic formation, which oen existed in contradistinction 
to the surrounding liberal, oen Protestant, culture.28 
However, this recognizably distinct set of lived practices has, in 
recent decades, been far less evident. ough there is debate about 
the extent to which Vatican II’s reformulation of doctrine caused 
changes in Catholics’ lived practices, the changes aer Vatican II, 
26 See Fergus Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic eologians: From Neoscholasticism 
to Nuptial Mystery (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007) for an excellent sur-
vey. His first chapter discusses some of the theologians who were not working in 
neo-omist strains, such as Romano Guardini. 
27 William Portier, “Here Come the Evangelical Catholics,” Communio 31 (2004): 
35-66. 
28 Evidence for this is in the way Catholic joke books can make jokes about nuns, 
rulers and knuckles. But what is sometimes forgotten is that most Catholic students 
these days are not taught by nuns, nor are there likely to be rulers involved; the joke 
no longer makes sense. 
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along with sociological changes in the United States at the same time, 
resulted in important modifications in Catholic doctrine and prac-
tice. e changes are well-known: Latin was no longer the liturgical 
language; religious life was no longer to be highlighted as the major 
means of Christian witness and discipleship; meatless Fridays were 
no longer mandated except during Lent. ese changes subsequently 
presented a challenge to American Catholics to ensure that, whatever 
the form, Christian discipleship was inextricably bound to concrete 
embodied practices. Yet this challenge had already been facing 
Protestants and therefore was one to which Hauerwas was respond-
ing.  
When Hauerwas congratulates Catholics for thinking “of them-
selves as Catholics [because] they had no concept of what it meant to 
be individuals [and] in fact, they believed one couldn’t be free if one 
wasn’t ultimately loyal to the church,”29 he responds to this kind of 
subculture that has slowly unraveled during the time Hauerwas has 
been a scholar. For theologians responding to the immediate aer-
math of Vatican II, Hauerwas seems overly authoritarian. In another 
example, when Hauerwas’s Catholic interviewer says “I was under 
the impression that we should be more ecumenical and see the good 
in all faiths,” Hauerwas responds, “[Y]ou were being corrupted. I’m 
absolutely serious about that. You were corrupted because what that 
[move toward seeing the good in all faiths] did was put compassion 
in the place of the crucified Savior.”30 Here Hauerwas exemplifies the 
importance of concrete embodiment, rather than generalizable con-
cepts. Yet, in Catholicism, this seems retrograde. Why get too close 
to someone who seems to want to return to the “bad old days” of a 
pre-Vatican II church?31  
Yet Hauerwas is actually decrying the effects of a certain kind of 
Christianity experienced in his own Protestant upbringing. His 
seeming collapse of the individual into the (hierarchical, no less) 
Church is prompted by experiences where Christians were no longer 
recognizably ecclesial in any way. Alongside this is what other 
Protestant theologians had seen in twentieth century theological tra-
jectories: making theology (especially the Church’s metaphysical 
claims) appear relevant to a world focused on empiricism and de-
manding proof for beliefs.32 Yet conceiving theology as chiefly about 
29 Stanley Hauerwas, “Christianity: It’s Not a Religion: It’s an Adventure” in e 
Hauerwas Reader, 522-535, at 523. 
30 Hauerwas, “Christianity: It’s Not a Religion: It’s an Adventure,” 526. 
31 Hauerwas, “Christianity: It’s Not a Religion: It’s an Adventure,” 523. 
32 See Stanley Hauerwas, “On Keeping eological Ethics eological” in e Hau-
erwas Reader, 51-74. H.R. Niebuhr’s e Meaning of Revelation discusses this prob-
lem as well, though Hauerwas finds particular problems with Niebuhr’s approach. 
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justifying the faith grants too much to a world already suspicious of 
Christ; it already makes Christians irrelevant and even non-existent, 
because their claims get dissolved by other modes of thinking. Hau-
erwas therefore ignores the question of relevance for a world that 
doesn’t care, in favor of worrying about Christians who are called to 
follow the way of Jesus, especially in the ways that they live their the-
ology. us Hauerwas sees that the particular kind of embodiment 
Catholics had prior to Vatican II as something important that was 
lost, whereas some Catholics have seen it as something to escape. 
e culture in which many of Hauerwas’s Catholic students have 
grown up, or at least been profoundly influenced by, has been like-
wise voluntaristic, private, and disembodied. So, for example, a major 
liberal tenet is that people are free to worship whom and where they 
choose. Once that is a possibility, however, people then feel the need 
to account for their religious affiliations and since many lack the re-
sources to discuss “reasons” for their faith (since faith in God is ap-
parently irrational), they fall back on their own preferences as “rea-
sons” and thereby have to push faith into privately-held corners. 
Faith then has no traction in the “public” arena because there is no 
way to adjudicate between peoples’ “preferences.” At the same time, 
Christians find themselves open to criticism from non-Christians 
because being a member of a church makes little or no difference to 
their lives.33 When asked about the “Real Presence” of Christ, a 
Catholic these days is just as likely to say “Well, we don’t really be-
lieve that” as she is to say, “Well, of course that’s the Real Presence.” 
With either answer, Catholicism gets dismissed, first because if ad-
herents do not believe in their convictions, what point is there to “be-
longing,” and second because such an answer does not adequately 
address modern concerns for epistemological certainty.  
In a way, developing Catholic identity in this privatized cultural 
context exhibits a set of problems that Hauerwas sees as common to 
Christians in America.34 I suspect that most of Hauerwas’s Catholic 
students came to study with him because they already were asking 
themselves the questions he deals with as a Protestant theologian and 
they had already wondered about (or at least suspected) that embod-
See further Stanley Hauerwas, Hannah’s Child: A eologian’s Memoir (Grand Rap-
ids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 58. 
33 See, for example, William Portier’s discussion of belief and participation in volun-
taristic “religion” in Tradition and Incarnation: Foundations of Christian eology 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1994), 50-1. 
34 ough, of course, the Pew Forum Survey, which has oen been cited as alarming 
by bishops and theologians both, already indicates that Catholics are experiencing 
the kind of disintegration that their mainline Protestant brothers and sisters have 
been seeing for decades longer. See http://religions.pewforum.org. 
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ied Christian practices might prove a way forward for Catholics and 
Protestants alike. ey came from a secular, liberal culture in which 
it is hard to have faith; Hauerwas helps them learn to think about 
these questions in distinctive and oen more helpful ways. Hau-
erwas’s Protestantism and reaction to it, is precisely part of the influ-
ence he wields on Catholic moral theology and because of that, Cath-
olic reception of Hauerwas’s work is to some extent generational.35  
I mention friendship and forgiveness as two practices in the above 
section, but I think Catholics (twenty-six Catholic doctoral students 
at both Notre Dame and Duke) are drawn to Hauerwas partly be-
cause of his strong use of the Church’s liturgy and sacraments as 
Christian practices.36 On Hauerwas’s account an alternative story is 
learned in ecclesial practices like baptism and the Eucharist, which 
embody the narrative of Christ’s life, death and resurrection. Unlike 
mainline Protestants, who tend to exhibit more of an abstract reli-
gious tradition based on principles and abstract reasoning, Catholics, 
evangelical Protestants, and Anabaptists figure as examples in Hau-
erwas’s writing of Christians who embody a particular story. What 
they have in common is not that they all exhibit the same kinds of 
practices nor the same views about doctrines, but that Christians 
from those traditions attempt to live in such a way as to focus cen-
trally on the story of Christ and witness to the world a different way 
to see.  
It may, partially, be this contrast between liberal Protestantism 
and other, more embodied Christianities that has led a few of his 
students to “convert” or come into full communion with the Roman 
Catholic Church. While each of their stories about “becoming Catho-
lic” are surely distinct, “being Catholic” is more about God’s grace in 
and through embodied lives, and far less about the position of the 
Church in culture. In my own case, the weekly practice of the Eucha-
rist, the embodied Christian practice of receiving Jesus’ Body and 
Blood in order to be Christ for the world, was central to coming into 
full communion.  
It might be seen as ironic, but it is true, that Hauerwas’ approach 
to the liturgy looks a lot like David Tracy’s “analogical” and Andrew 
Greeley’s “Catholic” imagination, as the whole world filled with and 
“enchanted” by God’s grace.37 What Hauerwas does is help Chris-
tians reflect on practices that we might otherwise pass by or overlook 
35 For example, William Cavanaugh, “Pilgrim People,” in Gathered for the Journey, 
88-105.  
36 I focus on Hauerwas’s doctoral students in this essay; his influence on Catholic 
master’s students is at least equally profound. 
37 See Greeley’s use of Tracy in e Catholic Imagination (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000), especially in the introduction. 
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out of hand. Baptism and Eucharist therefore become central to the 
work of many of Hauerwas’s students, which is exactly why a charge 
of sectarianism or a related focus on a hierarchical church makes lit-
tle sense.38 If there is a definition of “church” toward which Catholic 
Hauerwas students tend, I think it is a Lumen gentium focus39 on the 
sacrament of baptism that joins us to Christ’s body, and the Eucha-
rist that sustains us in that body, rather than a focus on a hierarchical 
church. So, for example, William Cavanaugh begins his essay “Pil-
grim People” by discussing the common contemporary adage, that 
“I’m spiritual, but not religious,” a phrase that suggests one’s person-
al philosophy over against “organized” religion. rough reading 
Scripture and thinking about the sacraments of the Church, 
Cavanaugh showcases not a “personal philosophy” so much as a 
movement of pilgrim people; the Church must be organized in order 
to carry out its mission. Yet Cavanaugh does not then move to a dis-
cussion of authority and hierarchy, but to a discussion of practices, 
virtues and how Christians hand on the faith to other Christians.40 
Cavanaugh thereby sidesteps one common debate about the recep-
tion of Vatican II: that church authorities have tried to draw lines 
that support hierarchical authority, while theologians have focused 
on the church of the laity.41 Focusing on embodied practices like the 
Eucharist enables Catholics to bridge that gap. 
Hauerwas’s students oen see that embodied practices are not 
limited to the sacraments and liturgy. 42 If there is something that 
unifies nearly all Catholic students of Hauerwas, it is that we focus on 
38 erese Lysaught writes about Eucharist and baptism as part of what it means to 
be Church. “In baptism, we are graed into the church, which is the body of 
Christ…. us in the liturgy we gather as the church, the body of Christ, to dwell 
with the one whose identity we have taken.” erese Lysaught, “Love and Liturgy,” 
in Gathered for the Journey, 24-42, at 35. Kelly Johnson, too, writes that “[l]iturgy, 
where the whole church joins through the Spirit in Christ’s priestly prayer to the 
Father, is the closest we get to our End, this side of the beatific vision. erefore the 
entirety of Christian life is preparation for liturgy.” Kelly Johnson, “Worshiping in 
Spirit and Truth,” in Unsettling Arguments, 300-314, here 312. 
39 See, for example, Lumen gentium, nos. 10 and 11, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ 
hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium 
_en.html.  
40 Cavanaugh, “Pilgrim People,”100-1.  
41 Note the differences between Giuseppe Alberigo’s e History of Vatican II (New 
York: Orbis Books, 2006) and Matthew Lamb and Matthew Levering’s volume Vati-
can II: Renewal Within Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
42 So, John Berkman writes about the practices of penance and reconciliation. “Eu-
charistic Reconciliation: Penitence, Punishment, and Worship,” e Journal for 
Peace and Justice Studies, 14:2 (Fall 2004): 179-196. Also reprinted as “Being Recon-
ciled to God and One Another,” e Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, eds. 
Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), 95-109. 
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embodied practices in some way, but we may discuss these practices 
in vastly different accounts. Hauerwas students write on topics as 
diverse as nonviolence,43 child abuse,44 begging,45 and disability.46 
ough Hauerwas’s Catholic students find themselves far from the 
days of a Catholic sub-culture that held some benefit against a volun-
taristic culture, they are certainly trying not to retrieve that sub-
culture but to respond to the needs of a culture that needs witnesses 
against child abuse and for hospitality. ere are disagreements 
among his students about “embodiment,” including pacifism, which 
is central in Hauerwas’s own work.47 But even in these disagree-
ments, there are common commitments to the importance of em-
bodiment, for, as Hauerwas argues, embodied practices are how 
Christians learn to say and show what it means to believe Christian 
convictions are true.  
 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY AFTER HAUERWAS: 
NATURAL LAW AND NONVIOLENCE 
But what is a Catholic supposed to make of Hauerwas’s view of 
natural law and particularly his practice of non-violence vis-à-vis the 
state? Here is where Hauerwas seems especially sectarian, because he 
seems to reject both natural theology and statecra, longstanding 
parts of Catholic tradition. is makes it seem all the more incredible 
that Catholic students should have chosen to study with him. 
e misunderstanding that Hauerwas utterly rejects all natural 
law or all positive conceptions of the state relies on the misconcep-
tion that Hauerwas has a position about things, including non-
violence. Hauerwas is far less interested in holding positions than he 
43 For example, Michael Duffey, Sowing Justice, Reaping Peace: Case Studies of Racial, 
Religious and Ethnic Healing Around the World (Franklin, WI: Sheed and Ward, 
2001). 
44 G. Simon Harak, “Child Abuse and Embodiment from a omistic Perspective,” 
Aquinas and Empowerment: Classical Ethics for Ordinary Lives, ed. G. Simon Harak 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 89-130. 
45 Kelly S. Johnson, e Fear of Beggars: Stewardship and Poverty in Christian Ethics 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006). 
46 Among others: Carol J. Descoteaux, Chronic Suffering: A eological and Ethical 
Reflection on Brazil’s Basic Ecclesial Communities and Jean Vanier’s L’Arche (South 
Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985). 
47 For example, David Matzko McCarthy, “Selective Conscientious Objection and 
Just War eory,” Bridges: An Interdisciplinary Journal in Philosophy vol. 14, no. 1/2 
(Spring/Summer 2007), 41-62. See also McCarthy’s e Good Life: Genuine Christi-
anity for the Middle Class (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2004), chapter 13. Non-Catholic 
students of his have also written arguing against Hauerwas’s non-violence. See Dan 
Bell, Just War in Christian Discipleship: Recentering the Tradition in the Church Ra-
ther than the State (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2009). 
 
                                                 
        Stanley Hauerwas’s Influence on Catholic Moral eologians 163 
 
is in “understanding intellectual work as investigation.”48 us, in 
many essays, he presents the task of Christian theology in terms of 
“learning how to go on” in the face of this or that turn in the world’s 
history.49 Hauerwas’s own theology is decisively shaped by his 
placement within mainline American Protestant theology, and his 
own “story” is portrayed in his seminar on “Christian Ethics in 
America.”50 Its digest is contained in the following aphorism: “How 
did a tradition that began with a book entitled Christianizing the So-
cial Order end up producing a book entitled Can Ethics Be Chris-
tian?” Hauerwas’s concern is thus how Protestants learn to go on in 
the face of the fading idea that they are in charge of America. When 
he titles a chapter “Taking the Bible Away from North America 
Christians,” he doesn’t establish a “position” that private Bible read-
ing is wrong.51 Rather, he intends this saying—as well as much of 
what he says about natural theology and statecra—in terms of a 
therapy for mainline Protestants recovering from the illusions of 
America as Christendom. 
 It is this way of practicing theology that Hauerwas aims to show 
his doctoral students: the point is “learning how to go on” as faithful 
witnesses, not “learning how to defend one particular position as the 
right one.” Instead, his students—from quite diverse ecclesial posi-
tions—also “learn to go on,” making different moves than Hauerwas 
himself. 
In terms of Catholicism, this way of practicing theology is per-
haps best seen in how Hauerwas encourages students to learn the 
works of omas Aquinas. Most students are likely to have encoun-
tered “that seminar,” the one that features Aristotle and Aquinas in 
large quantities. Hauerwas has taught this seminar in various itera-
tions since his time at Notre Dame. In the iteration I attended, we 
read the Nicomachean Ethics as well as the Secunda Pars of the Sum-
ma theologiae; omas featured in others of Hauerwas’s seminars as 
well. As Hauerwas writes in his memoir: “I read omas Aquinas as 
if he was conducting the kind of intellectual investigation I identified 
with Wittgenstein, but most of his commentators clearly assumed he 
had a position.”52 us, a way to read Hauerwas is that he has learned 
48 Stanley Hauerwas, Hannah’s Child: A eologian’s Memoir, 60.  
49 See, for example, chapters one and nine in Wilderness Wanderings with this for-
mulation in the title. Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century eology 
and Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). 
50Stanley Hauerwas, “Christian Ethics in America (and the JRE): A Report on a Book 
I Will Not Write,” Journal of Religious Ethics 25.3 (1997): 57-76. 
51 Stanley Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible from Captivity to 
America (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993). 
52 Stanley Hauerwas, Hannah’s Child: A eologian’s Memoir, 61. 
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to do theology by seeking to emulate the “intellectual investigation” 
of omas’s unending questions in the Summa, by asking good ques-
tions and testing peoples’ arguments (including those of hierarchical 
authorities). His students have, by and large, learned to carry on that 
work by testing assumptions, including Hauerwas’s own, most evi-
dent in the festschri Unsettling Arguments, but also in the ways his 
students have themselves learned to use omas Aquinas, beyond 
what Hauerwas taught.53  
Understanding that Hauerwas does not have “positions” in the 
terms commonly held in scholarship helps make his arguments 
about natural law and statecra more clear. He notes that  
 
for Aquinas, natural law serves neither as a principle that justifies a 
‘universal ethic’ abstracted from a community’s practices nor as a 
substitute for agents’ character and virtues. Rather, natural law is an 
exegetical principle necessary for reading the Old Testament as well 
as for helping us understand that when confronted by God’s law we 
always discover that we are sinners.54  
 
Holding natural law as a set of timeless universal moral norms sets 
out natural law as an objective “thing” to use in theories. It becomes 
an immovable position rather than part of an ongoing intellectual 
investigation. Jean Porter suggests the way natural law has become a 
“position” in Catholic thought: “natural law is usually regarded as a 
universal morality, accessible to all rational persons whatever their 
particular metaphysical or religious commitments (if any), and there-
53 A few of Hauerwas’s Catholic students have written directly on omas Aquinas 
in their dissertations. See, for example, Paul Wadell’s dissertation “An Interpretation 
of Aquinas’ Treatise on the Passions, the Virtues and the Gis from the Perspective 
of Charity with God,” or Dana Dillon’s dissertation, “As Soul to Body: e Interior 
Act of the Will in omas Aquinas and in Accounts of Moral Action,” in which she 
discusses the interior act of the will in relation to proportionalist debate. Current 
Hauerwas student Miguel Romero is writing on omas and disability. omas’s 
influence is profoundly noticed in many more students’ other written work. For 
example, Paul Wadell’s Friendship and the Moral Life (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1990) discusses Aquinas (and Aristotle); Fritz Bauerschmidt has 
written Holy Teaching: Introducing the Summa eologiae of omas Aquinas (Chi-
cago: Brazos Press, 2005), which discusses omas’s work as specifically theological, 
as well as edited the volume Aquinas in Dialogue: omas for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), with James Fodor. One of Hauerwas’s most 
recent students, Sheryl Overmyer, wrote her dissertation in part on omas Aquinas 
and has presented several essays on omas, including “Aquinas on the Virtues: e 
Difference Aristotle Makes,” presented at New Wine New Wineskins, a conference 
for young Catholic moral theologians, July 28-31, 2011. 
54 Hauerwas, In Good Company, 96. 
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fore most appropriately studied through philosophical analysis.”55 
(Porter goes on to argue, rightly I think, that natural law is theologi-
cal and, as she argues, related to virtue and Christian practice.56) 
It is this default description of natural law as an objective “thing” 
that Hauerwas rejects because it underwrites the development of a 
supposed universal ethic which turns out to be highly contested.57 
e difficulty with the default description of natural law is that it co-
exists with continuing tensions in Catholic moral thought and forces 
people to take extreme “positions” perhaps in the ways Russell Hit-
tinger claims: in some conversations, “[natural law] represented the 
conclusions of church authority” while in other conversations “it 
represented what every agent is supposed to know according to what 
is first in cognition.”58 As Hauerwas notes, natural law as a supposed 
alternative to ecclesiastical authoritarianism  
 
seems doubtful in light of the history of the use of ‘natural law’ by 
church authorities to support authoritarian positions. Indeed, I 
would suggest that part of the difficulty with the moral reasoning 
supporting some of the church’s sexual ethics is that by attempting 
to give them a ‘natural law’ basis devoid of their theological basis 
they appear arbitrary and irrational—thus requiring authoritarian 
imposition.59  
 
As in other debates, Catholic natural law ethics, especially in sexuali-
ty, looks like a debate between the Magisterium and the theologians, 
a debate in which Hauerwas refuses to take the “position” that marks 
him as on the “correct” side of the debate.60  
If Hauerwas concedes a kind of natural law (or so he argued in his 
doctoral seminar on Wittgenstein), it arises in relation to language 
and the way the Dominican Herbert McCabe has described law in 
55 Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A omistic eory of Natural Law (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 1.  
56 See especially chapters 3 and 4 in Nature as Reason. 
57 See Hauerwas, “In Praise of Centesimus Annus,” in In Good Company, 125-143. In 
this essay he writes: “By ‘methodological shortcomings’ I meant the abstract nature 
of encyclical pronouncements. e encyclicals by necessity must be written at a gen-
eralized level that makes their pronouncements seem platitudinous and/or irrelevant 
for policy decision. Moreover the encyclicals of the past have oen been based on 
‘natural law’ presuppositions that underwrite this abstract character” (125). 
58 Russell Hittinger, e First Grace: Rediscovering Natural Law in a Post-Christian 
World (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2003), 21. 
59 Stanley Hauerwas, e Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics 2nd edition 
(London: SCM Press, 2003), 64.  
60 See Richard McCormick, Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral eology (Kan-
sas City, MO: Sheed and Ward, 1994), especially 28-30. 
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Law, Love and Language.61 McCabe sees that to be human is to be 
biological and linguistic. Because we are linguistic animals, our ways 
of living and our practical reasoning are shaped by the linguistic 
communities of which we are a part. Hauerwas’s students Dana Dil-
lon and David Matzko McCarthy develop this point: “Natural law 
reasoning is not a set of rules or formulas for determining moral 
norms, but a way of rationally engaging and evaluating a variety of 
sources (both sacred and secular) for understanding the common 
good of human life….”62 Hauerwas’s Catholic students share, I think, 
his worries about universalizable natural law as a fixed “position,” 
but go on to develop an account of natural law as a tradition, an en-
terprise they share with many Catholics who have not studied with 
Hauerwas, as well (Jean Porter and Russell Hittinger among them). 
Statecra works similarly as an apparently unmovable universal 
ideal; it is too oen linked to an objective future reality toward which 
one aims. Once again, the (in)famous Hauerwasian invectives against 
the civil religious project called “America” must be seen in the con-
text of Protestant “learning how to go on” as Christians rather than 
imagining, as they used to, that being American and being Christian 
are the same. On that collapsed view, the social order is the means by 
which Christians can save the world, and the chief social order in 
play is democracy, but this is idolatrous because it presumes human 
activity saves.63 But there are other accounts of the good of the social 
order that can be affirmed in a questioning, open-ended way. An in-
terview Hauerwas did for the journal U.S. Catholic is telling in this 
regard. Hauerwas asks his interviewer: “Why do you think that your 
first task as a Christian is to make society work?” e interviewer 
answers, “Because I want to eat.”64 e interviewer’s answer is astute, 
and quite a Catholic answer: the point of statecra is to best enable 
people to live well and flourish and involves the complexity of ideas 
like the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity. Hauerwas con-
cedes that eating is a social good, but then goes on to a different ques-
tion: “e problem with affluent Christians in the United States to-
day is that they want to eliminate the otherness of poverty. ey say 
everybody can be rich. at is the vision of justice for Christians in 
the United States. It’s an elitist vision that makes the lives of anyone 
61 Herbert McCabe, Law, Love, and Language, (London: Continuum Press, 2003), 
especially chapter 3. 
62 Dana Dillon and David Matzko McCarthy, “Natural Law, Law and Freedom,” in 
Gathered for the Journey: Moral eology in Catholic Perspective, 153-176, at 168. 
63 Stanley Hauerwas, “A Christian Critique of Christian America” in e Hauerwas 
Reader, 459-480. Hauerwas further treats this idea in more detail in a number of 
essays from In Good Company: e Church as Polis. 
64 Stanley Hauerwas, “Christianity: It’s an Adventure,” 527. 
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who isn’t poor easier because they’ve already won.”65 While his 
Catholic interlocutor sees the good of a society struggling together to 
figure ways to eat, Hauerwas wants to keep raising questions, not 
allowing Catholics to rest easily on the supposed “success” of a social 
order without further interrogation. 
Hauerwas’s kind of theological interrogation is easily seen in Mi-
chael Baxter’s critique and synthesis of both Hauerwas and Catholic 
intellectual thought. Baxter is concerned with the ways that Catholic 
theologians have tended to categorize Hauerwas as taking a 
“Protestant either/or approach to these matters whereas Catholics 
take a both/and approach,”66 which marks out another dichotomiz-
ing tendency in Catholic theology. He suggests instead that it might 
be possible to include Hauerwas as part of the “both/and.” For exam-
ple, Catholics need not see church/state relations only as either “the 
politics of the world” or the Lordship of Christ but as “embracing 
both the Kingship of Christ and the politics of local community….”67 
At the same time, Baxter raises questions about Hauerwas’s discus-
sions of church/state and natural law that demonstrate the kind of 
traditioned conversation Hauerwas aims to develop. Baxter suggests 
that Hauerwas’s view of the Church as “polis” neglects important, 
non-theological, reasons for why Catholics care about civil societies.  
Instead of sustaining pretensions to a “Christian America,” Baxter 
notes a different kind of church/state conversation, with a different 
strategy for “learning how to go on.” He discusses a recent moment 
in the history of Catholic Worker in South Bend, Indiana, where the 
city of South Bend declared that the house was involved in code vio-
lations and the Catholic Worker house needed to defend itself, not 
theologically, but in terms of why it should exist in its particular 
neighborhood and house.68 e advocates for Catholic Worker had 
to use non-theological language well in order to make their case. See-
ing the Church as an alternate politic does not help Christians learn 
how to negotiate that there needs to be an energy company so that 
the light bulbs can be turned on. us Baxter argues for drawing 
more deeply from practical reasoning such that we learn to be both 
Christians witnessing to God in a world that does not always recog-
nize God, as well as people who can have practical conversations with 
diverse others that are not antithetical to the gospel. Like Hauerwas, 
Baxter refuses a “position” in an entrenched conversation. 
 
65 Stanley Hauerwas, “Christianity: It’s an Adventure,” 527. 
66 Michael Baxter, “e Church as Polis?” in Unsettling Arguments, 132-150, at 147. 
67 Baxter, “e Church as Polis?” 147. 
68 Baxter, “e Church as Polis?” 143. 
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A BRIEF CONCLUSION 
 Hauerwas’s students represent not a closed-off group of “disci-
ples” but a cadre of people aware of, but questioning, the dichoto-
mies and incoherences of contemporary ecclesial and civil life, glad 
to call each other “friends” as they practice their theology. ey are 
willing to critique each other as well as their doctoral advisor, but 
only alongside participation in Christian life. As I write this conclu-
sion, news of Father omas Weinandy’s talk to the Academy of 
Catholic eologians has made its way around the blogosphere. He 
mentions theologians as a “curse and affliction,” if they are not 
grounded in the faith; his implied presumptions about who was 
faithful and who was not set off yet again a firestorm of comments 
about divisiveness in the Church.69 Commenters suggested that Wei-
nandy’s comments highlight once again the divisiveness between the 
Magisterium and theologians, and between liberal and conservative. I 
wonder if Hauerwas’s particular way of engaging traditions points a 
way forward.  
Already some of Hauerwas’s Catholic students have raised the 
question, wondering about how to have the kind of conversation that 
they learned from Hauerwas, that honestly interrogates people from 
across “sides”—in this case both Magisterium and theologians. Dana 
Dillon comments on the Weinandy speech by writing:  
I do think that there are two…clusters that (loosely) line up some-
where like what is named by the labels conservative/liberal or 
right/le. I think that far too oen, people in each of these clusters 
stay largely within their own cluster. ey talk with other people in 
their cluster, they read and cite and engage with other people in their 
cluster…. I wonder if it is possible for theologians—in the midst of 
their different sets of assumptions—to have a genuine conversation 
about these differences. What would it be like if we began with the 
assumption that the other—as right or wrong as we might imagine 
his or her positions to be—was shaped by and wanted to be true to a 
genuine animating faith and a true desire to serve both the Gospel 
and the Church?70 
e timbre of the conversation makes it seem that both “sides” are 
closed off from each other, and each sees the other “side” as neither 
69 Fr. omas Weinandy, OFM Cap, “Faith and the Ecclesial Vocation of the Catho-
lic eologian,” Origins CNS Documentary News Service 41.10 (July 21, 2011): 154-
163. e speech was popularized via John Allen’s article “Bishop’s Staffer on Doc-
trine Rips eologians as ‘Curse’,” National Catholic Reporter (August 16, 2011), 
http://ncronline.org/news/people/bishops-staffer-doctrine-rips-theologians-curse. 
70 Dana Dillon, “Against Divisiveness in eological Discourse,” Catholicmoraltheol-
ogy.com, http://catholicmoraltheology.com/against_divisiveness/.  
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listening nor inviting conversation. Into this mix, can Hauerwas’s 
emphases on forgiveness, friendship, and open-ended theological 
reading and interrogation bring a better way forward for Catholic 
moral theology?71  
 
71 I am indebted to conversations with Stanley Hauerwas, Dana Dillon, Sheryl 
Overmyer, Andy Grubb, David Cloutier, David Matzko McCarthy, and Michael 
Baxter, as well as with my colleagues at UD: William Portier, Dennis Doyle, Kelly 
Johnson, and Brad Kallenberg, in the writing of this piece. 
 
                                                 
